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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on the 1995 Latin American and 1997 East Asian crises using an
insurance-based model of financial crises. First the model of Dooley (forthcoming) is described.
Second, some empirical evidence for an insurance model is presented. The key variables in this
approach include the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to bank loans (domestic credit) extended to
the private sector, the ability of the private sector to appropriate government assets, and
appropriation as measured by capital flight. We argue that the insurance model is consistent with the
observed evolution of these variables in the recent crises in Latin America and Asia.Finally, we
examine the statistical evidence in favor of the model using panel regressions. We find that the
econometric results are consistent with the insurance model, and tend to support this approach over some
competing explanations.
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A comparison of the currency crises of East Asia and Latin American presumes there is
something different about East Asia that makes it a natural aggregate for analysis. Until quite
recently the distinguishing characteristics relative to other regions have been strong
administrative controls of domestic and international financial markets, heavily managed
exchange rates, rapid growth of international trade and an admirable degree of financial stability.
However, the devaluation of the Thai baht and the related attacks on other East Asian currencies
have reinforced the warnings from economists that there is nothing inherently special about
international finance in East Asia. Indeed, Kamin sky and Reinhart (1998b) have argued that
whatever differences may have existed in the past between these two regions, they are fast
disappearing. Hence, policy conflicts associated with the implicit guarantees associated with a
managed nominal exchange rate and other monetary and fiscal objectives are very likely to lead
to speculative attacks whether in Korea or in Mexico.
Moreover, at least two new sets of reasons to worry about speculative attacks have
emerged since 1992. Spectacular attacks on the European Exchange Rate Mechanism suggested
that the usual policy conflicts might not be necessary to trigger an attack. One idea is that
financial policies of the government might make the regime vulnerable to "self-fulfilling' shifts
in private expectations (e.g., Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993; Obstfeld, 1994) The other
important development is the realization that international capital inflows might set the stage for
attacks on recently liberalized domestic financial markets.
For emerging markets in East Asia these new reasons to worry about speculative attacks
are particularity relevant. As discussed below, both theories suggest that a country can get all the
usual "IMF fundamentals" right and still see its monetary arrangements destroyed by a successful
1speculative attack. The reasons to avoid such situations are clearly illustrated in recent revised
projections for growth rates in countries that have suffered through recent attacks.
In Section 2 we lay out the intuition for the insurance model developed in Dooley
(forthcoming). This is a "first generation" model of speculative attacks in which the policy
conflict is between a credit constrained government's desire to accumulate liquid assets and its
desire to insure domestic financial systems. Section 3 interprets the behavior of key variables in
the context of this model --suchas the size of the insurance pool and extent of capital inflows,
the duration of the inflow and degree to which the private sector is able to appropriate
government assets, and the observable manifestations of the gap between the government's state
contingent assets and liabilities. Unfortunately, all these variables are difficult to measure
directly. In the latter case, actual contingent assets and liabilities are not observable, so we take
as proxies bank lending to the private sector, under the presumption that the government cannot
afford to allow the banking system to collapse. Liabilities are at a first approximation equal to
foreign exchange reserves. This approach also implies that one sees the first manifestation of an
incipient currency crisis not in the usual macroeconomic observables (interest rates, exchange
rate overvaluation, etc.), but in "capital flight".
In Section 4, we present a formal econometric examination of the data, focusing on five
Latin American and six East Asian countries over the sample period 1980-1997. We find that
there is substantial evidence consistent with our model. We also subject the empirical model to
some robustness checks to see whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of variables that
other competing models imply should determine financial crises. Section 5 concludes.
2. An Insurance Model
The argument is close to the spirit of that offered by Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and
2developed further by Velasco (1987). The policy conflict in the model to be tested below is
between the desire of a credit-constrained governments to hold reserve assets as a form of self-
insurance and the government's desire to insure financial liabilities of residents. The first
objective is met by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and lines of credit. The second
objective generates incentives for investors to acquire the government's liquid assets when yield
differentials make this optimal.
These ingredients provide a plausible capital inflow/crisis sequence. An important feature
of our version of the model is that the capital inflow does not simply contribute to the
vulnerability of the regime. Because the government is credit constrained, it cannot borrow
against future tax receipts in order to delay a crisis. In this environment credible free insurance
raises the market yield on a set of liabilities issued by residents for a predictable time period.
Yields rise because residents compete in order to exploit the insurance. This resulting yield
differential between insured domestic "deposits" and the international risk free rate generates a
private gross capital inflow (a sale of domestic liabilities to nonresidents) that continues until the
day of attack. The private inflow is necessarily associated with some combination of an increase
in the government's international reserve assets, a current account deficit and a gross private
capital outflow. When the government's reserves are exactly matched by its contingent insurance
liabilities, the expected yield on domestic liabilities falls below market rates and investors sell
the insured assets to the government, exhausting its reserves. The speculative attack is fully
anticipated and at the time of the attack nothing special happens to the fundamentals or
expectations about the fundamentals.
This sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1.' The positive vertical axis in the top
'The dynamics of the model are set out more carefully in Dooley (forthcoming).
3panel measures the stock of assets the government, including the central bank, could liquidate
during a crisis in order to redeem liabilities to the private sector. The negative vertical axis
measures the government's total stock of contingent and noncontingent liabilities. We start from
a situation in which the value of assets, A0, is growing but is less than L0 the value of debt.2 A
fall in international interest rates at t1 reduces the value of government's long term liabilities from
L0to L1, but does not affect the contractual value of short term assets. A part of the government's
assets can now support additional liabilities.
In the middle panel we show the stock of insured private liabilities. At t1 residents that
can issue an insured liability will now offer to do so in order to appropriate some share "s" of the
proceeds3. Sellers of such liabilities are residents simply because only residents' liabilities are
eligible for insurance. The government's contingent liability is the same fraction of new insured
liabilities (the shaded area in the middle panel).
The value of s is specific to the country and is small in a well regulated market and large
in a poorly regulated market. The time derivative of the flow of new issues (the slope of PL) is
also specific to each country and is also a function of the supervisory system in place. Relatively
poorly regulated financial markets will see a relatively rapid increase in insured liabilities4.
Investors are willing to buy residents' liabilities because they are insured and because
market value of the debt would be equal to the collateral value. That is there would be a secondary market
price discount. See Dooley eta!.(1996)for a model and evidence.
A more realistic form of appropriation is state contingent. That is, insured residents exploit insurance by
reaching for risk. They share returns earned in good states of the world and default in bad states of the world.
In the diagram it is assumed that implicit liabilities grow more rapidly than reserves. This does not follow from
theory. In fact an important difference between emerging markets and industrial countries is that the governments
in industrial countries constrain domestic intermediaries before the government's net worth is exhausted. Thus, in
the US savings and loan crisis there was no run on the government's reserves. Instead a binding constraint was
established by reregulating the financial system. The resulting loss to the government was substantial but well
within its ability to provide credible insurance.
4competition among (resident) sellers will force them to share a part of their appropriation with
(nonresident) creditors. This will take the form of above market expected yields on residents'
liabilities5. Yields will be the same for both domestic currency and foreign currency liabilities of
residents as long as the insurance is expected to cover both types of domestic liabilities.6
As long as the "foreign" investors earn above market yields there is a disincentive for an
attack on the government's assets. Investors will prefer to hold the growing stock of high yield
insured liabilities of residents and allow the government to hold reserves that earn the risk free
rate. Private profits are realized before the attack. The attack itself is generated by competition to
avoid losses. When the contingent liabilities of the government are just equal to liquid assets (A2
=L2),competitionamong investors will insure that all will call the insurance option. The bottom
panel of Figure 1 reflects the assumption that nonresidents demand a constant premium in order
to accumulate insured deposits. On the day of the attack the expected value of this premium
becomes negative because each depositor's share of the insurance pool will begin to shrink.
Resident borrowers will continue to appropriate a part of new loans and this will depress
The accounting is straightforward if we abstract from financial intermediation. Suppose a resident household
can issue a $10 liability to a foreign investor. The household plans on repaying $5. The household shares its gain by
paying the investor $2.50 and keeping $2.50. The investor expects the government to purchase the liability for $10
in one year. The government's contingent liability is $5.00. More realistic examples will involve one or more
financial intermediaries in this process. The distribution of the rents among the participants will depend on their
relative bargaining power. If investors' demand for claims on residents are very elastic, residents will capture most
of the rents. This seems to us the most likely outcome. It is difficult to interpret historical evidence for deposit
rates. As insurance became credible after 1989 deposit rates should have fallen as default risk was absorbed by the
government. In Mexico real ex post rates on domestic deposits (adjusted for actual changes in dollar exchange
rates) fell from about 15 percent above US rates in 1990 to equality with US rates in late 1994. While this pattern in
returns is consistent with our model, Mexico's stabilization program may have had important implications for this
history of yield differentials. See Kaminsky and Leiderman (1996) for a discussion of stabilization plans and real
interest rates.
If the insurance is only available on domestic (foreign currency) liabilities an equilibrium covered interest
differential will emerge in favor of domestic (foreign currency) liabilities. A fixed exchange rate regime is not
crucial for the argument. Under floating exchange rates the nonresident investor plans to liquidate her position at the
time of the anticipated attack. It follows that any spot foreign exchange transactions will be offset by a matching
forward exchange transaction. Private interest arbitrage will ensure that there is no net change in spot or forward
rates.
5expected yields on deposits that after t1areonly partially insured.
Following an attack the regime returns to its initial equilibrium in which the government's
net international reserves have returned to zero. The crisis does nothing to resolve the underlying
policy conflict. Following the crisis the government will once again attempt to accumulate liquid
assets and unexpected capital gains and losses on the governments asset position will eventually
generate a new inflow/attack sequence.
3. Empirical Implications
3.1 Examples of Changes in Binding Constraints
Three "insurance fundamentals" must be present in order to generate a private capital
inflow followed by a speculative attack. The first is that a credit constrained government must
have positive net assets. Net assets are defined to include some contingent assets and liabilities
but not the present value of future tax receipts. Second, the government's commitment to exhaust
these net reserves to pay off an implicit or explicit insurance contract must be credible. That is, it
must be consistent with the government's incentives and ability to mobilize and exhaust a well
defined set of assets after the attack begins. Third, private investors must have access to
transactions that produce insured losses.
All three factors must be present to trigger a capital inflow and subsequent attack. One or
more of these fundamentals are found in most countries most of the time. But as long as one
ingredient is missing there will be no capital inflow and no crisis. Crisis episodes are associated
with the relaxation of a binding constraint, It follows that there is no simple temporal ordering of
changes in insurance fundamentals and crises.
A government with open financial markets, weak regulatory systems and a credible
6commitment to insure a well-defined set of residents' liabilities will not experience a sequence of
capital inflows followed by an insurance attack unless it has net assets to expend during the
attack. For middle income developing countries with substantial stocks of external debt the
missing fundamental from 1982 through 1989 was a stock of assets to support a credible
insurance commitment. For this group of countries an important source of changes in the value
of governments' net assets has been changes in the market value of governments' external debt
caused by changes in international interest rates.
Table 1 shows data for individual emerging markets that accounted for about 80 percent
of the total capital inflow to emerging markets from 1990-1996. Column one shows the
cumulative net private capital inflow to each country over the seven year time period. Our
hypothesis is that all these capital inflows were generated by credible insurance policies. The
capital gain on external debt outstanding in 1989 was the product of outstanding debt and the
change in the relevant interest rate on that debt. Because the currency denomination of the Latin
American and Asian debt was quite different in 1990 we construct a weighted average
international interest rate for each debt stock (see Figure 2). The sensitivity of the market value
of Latin American debt is clear because it traded at substantial discounts before the drop in
interest rates. The secondary market price for Latin American debt, also shown in Figure 2,
jumps from about thirty cents to near par as interest rates declined. There is no similar change in
the market value of Asian debt because its market price was near par in 1990. Our interpretation
of this data is that Latin American governments could not have had net assets to cover new
insurance as long as existing government liabilities sold for substantially below par. The fall in
international interest rates eliminated the claims of existing creditors in excess of governments'
assets in 1990. The capital gain in 1990 was about one half of the initial stock of floating rate
7external debt shown in column two. From this point forward capital gains on debt and other asset
accumulation provided a credible insurance pool. A similar capital gain for Asian governments
created an immediate insurance pool.
Table 1 also provides evidence that liquid assets were accumulated. The change in
international reserve assets and official rescue packages provide rough measures of assets
available to support an inflow/crisis sequence. Column three shows the cumulative change in
international reserve assets over the same time period. Reserves were augmented by contingent
lines of credit from other governments and international organizations. Column four shows that
a large share of the resources made available to private investors following the Mexican crisis,
about $47 billion, came from loans from creditor governments and international organizations
(Boughton, forthcoming). Official credits to Indonesia, Korea and Thailand following the Asian
crisis totalled about $118 billion and in 1998 Russia received an additional $22.6 billion in
official credit (IMF 1998). While only suggestive, this data is consistent with the view that,
except in the transition economies, capital gains on debt were an important contribution to net
assets as international interest rates fell after 1989. Moreover, for all the emerging economies,
the sum of capital gains on debt and the subsequent accumulation of international reserves and
credit lines were of roughly the same magnitude as private capital inflows. Figure 3 below
confirms the assertion that the actual inflows and the predicted inflows match almost one-for-
one. An OLS regression of cumulative net inflows on the insurance pool figures implied by Table
1 yields a slope coefficient of 0.97, with a standard error of 0.04, and an R2 of 0.92.
Another plausible sequence of events that would trigger an inflow/crisis sequence is
economic reform in developing and transition economies. Reform involves both opening of
domestic financial markets and improved access to international financial markets. These
8programs relax three constraints. First, they make domestic liabilities available to foreign
investors. Second, they make the existing regulatory framework less effective. These effects of
liberalization are discussed and modeled in McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Krugman (1998).
Kaminsky and Reinhart (forthcoming) offers empirical evidence that liberalization helps predict
banking crises. Our approach suggests that the third condition, positive net assets, was also an
important constraint. Liberalization provided an insurance pool because, as noted above, creditor
governments and international organizations have provided generous lines of credit to support
reform programs.
3.2 Bank Credit, Lending Booms and Reserves
It might appear that this model reduces, in its empirical manifestation, to the familiar
Krugman (1979) speculative attack model, with slightly different definitions for assets and
liabilities. In fact, the redefinition of liabilities and assets to include contingent ones is of key
importance. The central variable in the Krugman model is the reserves to narrow money (M1)
ratio. Mexico does appear to conform to the suggested pattern, although it is interesting that the
ratio does not decline until the end of first quarter 1994. Brazil and Argentina clearly do not fit
the pattern (the actual series are displayed in the working paper version of this article).
Thailand and Malaysia do display a declining reserves to M1 ratio for the year preceding
the crisis. Indonesia, in contrast, exhibits rising ratios leading up to the crisis. The Korean
reserves to money ratio peaks at the end of the second quarter of 1997, just a few months before
the won devaluation.
In order to examine the implications of the insurance model, we redefine the contingent
liabilities to equal the bank loans extended to the private sector (i.e., domestic credit). This
implies that the government is generally unwilling to allow the banking system to collapse, and
9either explicitly or implicitly guarantees these deposits.7
One indicator of the fragility of the banking sector (and the proportion of bad loans) is the
rate of growth of domestic credit. Various researchers (Kaminsky and Reinhart, forthcoming,
1998a) have shown a correlation between banking crises and currency crises. Kaminsky and
Reinhart also show that rapid growth of domestic credit two years lagged two years is a good
predictor of a financial crisis. Rapid domestic credit growth also finds a role in various post-
mortem accounts (e.g., BIS, 1998, Chapter VII). Chinn and Dooley (1997) find some evidence
that rapid expansion of bank lending increases the riskiness of the marginal project in some
Pacific Rim countries.
The model predicts that the reserves to domestic credit variable (RS_DCR). should be
falling in the period leading up to a crisis, while LGBOOM variable should peak around 2 years
prior to the crisis. Mexico approximately fits this pattern (four years would be closer), as does
Argentina. Brazil's ratio does not fit the pattern, although the lending boom variable does climb
steeply two years prior to the Tequila Effect (the Real stabilization plan in June of 1994 may
complicate the interpretation of these data).
For Thailand, reserves to money declines in the first quarter of 1996 onward. The peak in
the domestic credit growth is exactly two years before the crisis. Malaysia and, to a lesser extent,
Singapore also fit this pattern. For the former the reserves to money ratio is declining over the
entire period from 1994Q1 to 1997Q3, and for the latter, from 1994Q1 to 1996Q2, and
One criticism of this approach might be that one should use the ratio of nonperforming loans to adjust the size
of contingent liabilities. However, such data are administrative in nature, and are probably uninformative regarding
the true extent of banking sector problems. In fact, to the extent that regulators may hesitate to declare loans
nonperforming for fear of forcing bankruptcy, the nonperforming loan ratio may exhibit perverse behavior. Corsetti,
Pesenti and Roubini (1998) report positive results using a considerably modified measure of nonperforming loans.
10stabilizing thereafter.8
Indonesia presents an interesting case. Bank lending exploded in the early 1990s, growing
at an annualized rate of 38% per year, then plummeting to 5% in 1993 before accelerating again
in 1993. bank lending growth rose again. RS_DCR also peaks exactly two years before the crisis.
Korea's RS_DCR ratio declines from its peak in 1996Q1, and then plummets again beginning in
1997Q2 as the other East Asian currencies fall. While bank lending growth does not peak two
years before the Won crisis, it does decelerate.
The end result of these rapid expansions in bank lending is a large nonperforming loan
problem in many of these countries, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand face serious property
sector risks. Korea, on the other hand, faces a very serious corporate sector risk, in the form of
nonperforming loans extended to the chaebols (Morgan Guaranty, 1998).
3.3 Property Booms and Capital Flight
As noted above a wide variety of financial transactions might generate implicit liabilities
for the government. Depending on the regulatory environment, financial institutions engaged in
looting will seek out transactions that are least likely to attract attention from the authorities.For
example, our interpretation of the prevalence of real estate lending leading up to crises is that
loans based on this type of collateral are generally favoured by regulatory authorities. Given
perfect foresight, the run up in property values preceding the crisis reflects property owners
bargaining position in the game. Since property owners know that looting requires their
cooperation in borrowing against property, a rising price for their property is necessary to
8Galindoand Maloney (1998), drawing on Calvo and Mendoza (1996a,b) and Krugman models, find that the
ReserveslM2 ratio predicts speculative pressure well for their sample, except for the East Asian countries (their
sample did not include the 1997 crises, however). This Reserves/M2 ratio behaves similarly to the RS_DCR ratio in
our sample, although the latter tends to fall more substantially prior to a crisis, in our dataset.
11compensate them. Notice that in this context the property owner is selling the property to the
bank since both parties know that the crisis is coming and that the collateral will be forfeited. In
fact, competition among property owners will ensure that all the property will be owned by the
banks when the crisis occurs. The same argument explains the run up in the value of equities and
other assets that typically serve as collateral for bank credit.
All the private participants in this game will look forward to conditions following the
crisis. It seems quite likely that assets that are not insured might be vulnerable to taxation in
order to offset the government's loss. Thus, while private capital inflows are observed residents
will also export private capital in order to avoid post crisis taxation. The empirical counterpart to
this is unrecorded increases in gross private claims on nonresidents.
The fact that residents are trying to hide these assets from the domestic authorities makes
measurement of capital flight difficult but a number of statistical procedures have proven useful.
In this paper we use a residual method that exploits the country's balance of payments data but
augments this with data for international lending to the country reported by other countries.9
Figure 4 presents comparative data for Latin America and East Asia over the 1978-94 period.
The striking feature of this data is that capital flight was not an important factor in Asia before
and following the 1982 debt crisis. Our interpretation is that an insurance crisis in Latin America
was not present in Asia in this time period. This we think accounts for the Asian emerging
markets being little effected by the 1982 crisis. In contrast capital flight was clearly a problem in
Asia after 1993. In Figure 5, estimates for capital flight (expressed as a proportion of GDP) are
presented for the three largest Latin American countries over the 1990 to 1996 period. A positive
number indicates "capital flight". Figure 6 shows that there was substantial capital flight from
These figures are the "adjusted World Bank" capital flight numbers. See Dooley (1988) for a discussion.
12East Asia in 1993-95. Indonesia exhibits the most variable and substantial magnitudes of capital
flight over the sample period. Although the peak capital flight for Indonesia is 10.8% of GDP in
1994, the figure for 1997 is still a considerable 2% of GDP. Korean capital flight is also
substantial. Between 1993 to 1996, capital flight ranges between 2-3% of GDP (Figure 7). This
suggests that residents saw trouble coming and moved their assets beyond the reach of the
domestic government. It is simply implausible that the gross capital inflow over these same
years was not largely motivated by the expectation that the government would back some setof
insured positions when the crisis occurred.
3.4 Duration of capital inflows
Although a capital inflow/crisis sequence is likely to begin at about the same time for
many indebted developing countries following a decline in international interest rates, the
duration of the inflow and the timing of the expected crisis can vary widely. In fact, a crisis
might never occur if the government reacts properly. The duration of the capital inflow will
depend on the rate at which banks, households and firms can sell insured liabilities and on the
profitability of appropriation. If the share of each deposit appropriated is low because of
regulatory constraints, appropriation may become unprofitable before the governments net assets
are exhausted. The important implication is that crises will be spread over time and move from
poorly to well-regulated financial systems.
A common negative shock to governments' net assets could truncate this process and
generate a number of crises at the same time. In this case a common fundamental has changed
and crises are bunched in time for this reason not because events in one country alter
expectations about events in others. As shown in Figure 2, international interest rates did rise
just before the Mexican crisis in 1994 and this common shock may explain the so-called tequila
13effect.
Crises might also be bunched in time because of revisions in expected values of official
lines of credit. When an attack occurs, investors receive new information about the size and
likely distribution of official credits available to cover insurance commitments. If the expected
overall size of official lending is revised downward this can generate coincident runs in many
countries. Following crises in Mexico and Russia, for example, there were considerable
differences of opinion concerning the willingness or ability of the US government and
international organizations to support additional loan programs in the face of congressional
opposition. This may have reduced the expected value of official credits to other countries,
perhaps to levels that made immediate attacks optimal. Even if the expected pool ofloans is
unchanged, the observation of loans to an individual country provides additional information
about the expected distribution of loans over countries. On average expectations for half of the
countries will be revised downward and some of these might be pushed over the attack threshold.
Ignoring the issue of interest rate increases, it still might be useful to consider the simple
relationship between the duration of the capital inflow and some measure of the how able the
government is willing to regulate financial markets. The model argues thatceteris paribus a more
transparent regulatory and financial system will tend to extend the periodof time before a crisis
occurs. In Figure 8, we assume that either the decline in US interest rates in 1990 orliberalization
of the capital account triggers the beginning of capital inflows. DURATION4 is the number of
quarters from the beginning of inflows or liberalization to the crisis '°;TRANSPRNT96is an
10Formost countries, the beginning of inflows is dated at 1990Q1, as US real interest rates begin to fall. For
Korea and Taiwan opening is dated at 1989Q1, as suggested by Chinn and Maloney (1998), while Singapore's and
Malaysia's are dated by Chinn and Frankel (1994) at 1987Q1 and 1985Q2, respectively. The former two estimates
are based on inverted quasi-money demand curves, while the latter two are based on covered interest differentials.
14inverse measure of corruption in 1996, described further below in Section 4. According to a
truncated regression estimation procedure, there is a positive relationship between the (log)
inverse of corruption and the duration, which is statistically significant." A 10% decrease in
corruption yields a point estimate implying a 2.5quarterincrease in the duration of the inflows
[with thestandard error bands ranging from (2.0 to 2.9)].
4. Panel Regression Analysis
4.1 Data and Model Specification
In this section, we present some formal econometric results which bear upon the issue of
which models describe the onset of crises in these countries. We do not attempt to replicate the
comprehensive cross-country analyses, such as Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky, Lizondo and
Reinhart (1998), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) or
Berg and Patillo (1998). Rather we focus on eleven countries that account for a large proportion
of total capital flows to emerging markets during the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, we attempt to
more closely locate the timing of the crises and hence distinguish among competing hypotheses.
The analysis is conducted on quarterly data for the period 1980Q1 to 1997Q4 for the Latin
American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, and the East Asian
countries of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Most of the data
are drawn from the TIME's international Financial Statistics, June 1998 CD-ROM.
We use several measures of crises. The first is a binary variable defined using a threshold
of a 20% quarterly change in the log bilateral real exchange rate (CR1SJSR). The second is
"Obviously, since some countries do not experience a crisis, OLS is not appropriate. We estimated truncated
regression in a semi-log specification; the slope coefficient is positive and statistically significant with or without
inclusion of a constant (the latter is consistent with the view that the attack takes place instantaneously if a regime is
completely unable to prevent the private sector from appropriating government assets). Since the constant is not
statistically significant, we report in the text the results without the constant.
15defined using a weighted average of the log first differences the real exchange rate and of
international reserves, using a 20% cutoff (CRISI2R). Three quarters weight is placed on the
change in the bilateral exchange rate, and one quarter on the change in reserves. The third
(CRISIS_P) is the same as CRISI2R, except the cutoff value is 12.5%, and it defines a crisis
period as the period in which the threshold is breached, plus the three subsequent quarters.
For the determinants of crises, we use a number of variables mentioned in the graphical
assessment of the model. Ideally, we would like to directly measure the growth of governments'
implicit liabilities. This is possible following a crisis since transfers to financial markets measure
accumulated appropriation by the private sector. Such figures are reported by Corsetti, Pesenti
and Roubini (1998) for one year --1996.However, it is impossible to obtain these variables for
long time series as we require them. For the key variables we use the ratio of foreign exchange
reserves to domestic credit extended to the private sector as a measure of the gap between
contingent assets and liabilities (RS_DCR). As discussed above the share of domestic credit that
is the government's contingent liability is related to three variables that we can observe. The first
is the change in log real domestic credit (LDCD9O) over a 2 year period (LGBOOM); in the
regressions, this variable is lagged by two years. The second is the volume of capital flight. The
dollar amount of capital flight is measured using the World Bank approach. That is, capital flight
is the sum of the current account surplus and increases in external debt, less recorded net private
capital inflows and increases in official reserve assets. This variable is converted into domestic
currency terms and expressed as a proportion of GDP (CFLT).'2 The third is the quality of
regulation in domestic financial markets. We do not have direct observations on this variable,
12Sincethe debt figures are available only at the annual frequency, we have generated quarterly series by using a
HP filter
16but we can proxy it with indices of corruption. The index we use is that of Transparency
International (TI). TI reports corruption perceptions indices ranging in value from 10 (highly
clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). The logged 1996 value of this index (LTRANSPRNT96) is used.13
The US real interest rate (R(s) is also included as changes in this rate will revalue the external
debt of these countries.
The regressions are estimated using probit'4, in the following specification,
CRISJS =f(RS_DCR, LGBOOMS, TRANSPRNT96, CFLT,8; Z) (1)
whereZisa set of other variables that are included with, or substitute for, the key variables
implied by our model and can be thought of as controls, or robustness checks. The variables
include the trade balance to GDP ratio (TB_Y) and the multilateral real exchange rate deviation
from a linear trend (DEVJ) (Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdés, 1995). For purposes of
comparison, we include a number of other indicators that are suggested by other models, such as
the reserves to M1 ratio (RS_MRT) (Krugman, 1979) and reserves to M2 ratio (RS_M2R) (Calvo
and Mendoza, 1996b). Note that no fixed effects are included in the panel regressions, so all
countries are treated as identical. Obviously, a much better fit could be obtained merely by
The TI Corruption Perceptions Indices are based on survey data from Economist Intelligence Unit, Gallup
International, Institute for Management Development, Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Political Risk
Services, World Development Report and World Economic Forum. Details of construction of the indices is reported
in TI (1998). While period averages are given for the 1980-85 and 1988-92 periods, and a value for both 1996 and
1998, the data ase not really comparable over time. In some regressions incorporating time varying values of the
inverse corruption index, the coefficient is usually insignificant. 'Insome other studies, such as Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998),
continuous indicator variables have been used as the regressand. We also estimated OLS regressions incorporating
the underlying data in CRJSI2R. The results are weaker, with only the RIS and DEVI coefficients exhibiting
statistical significance in the correct direction (LGBOOM is also significant but incorrectly signed). We view crises
as discrete occurrences, in which case the limited dependent variable approach is the more appropriate one.
17including country effects.
4.2 Empirical Results
The results are reported in Tables 2-4. Table 2 contains the regression results using the
CRISISR dependent variable. Since the absolute magnitudes of the probit regression coefficients
have no simple economic interpretation, we only indicate the statistical significance of the
coefficients. (Note that almost all the statistically significant coefficients are of correct sign; only
in Table 4 do some incorrectly signed coefficients have some statistical significance, and then
only at the 20% marginal significance level.) A baseline regression specification including only
reserves to domestic credit, lagged lending boom, and the US real interest rate (column 1)
indicates that the key variable exhibits statistical significance. This is a robust finding across all
regressions.
The lagged lending boom also exhibits statistical significance at the 10% level, a result
echoed in the other specifications. Finally, the real US interest rate is not significant in this
simplest of specifications. Next, we augment the basic specification with either an inverse
corruption measure (column 2) or capital flight (column 3). In the latter case, capital flight does
not show up as important, while the real interest rate is now significant at the 20% level. The
inverse corruption measure is also marginally significant. However, inclusion of both of these
measures (which attempt to proxy for the same factor) yields insignificant coefficients on both.
Nonetheless, the key variables —reservesto domestic credit and the lagged lending boom —are
still statistically significant.
In the next three columns we report results of three robustness checks. First, one might
argue that reserves always decline prior to a crisis, and so it is not surprising that we find
statistical significance for this variable. However, the evidence does not appear to bear out this
18assertion. The reserves to M1 ratio does not evidence statistical significance (column 5);
moreover, the McFadden R2 drops from .22 to .15. This pattern of results is repeated elsewhere.
The reserves to M2 ratio works somewhat better (results not reported), but is still inferior in
performance to that of the reserves to domestic credit ratio.
We also examine whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of variables that are
not important in our model, but are in others —namelythe trade balance to GDP ratio and the
real exchange rate overvaluation (DEV]). Only the latter is significant in column 6, while the
lending boom becomes insignificant. The RS_DCR coefficient is robust to the inclusion of these
additional regressors.
How does one interpret the statistical significance of DEVJ? Given that the dependent
variable is based on the change in the real exchange rate, we view these results as confirming the
Goldfajn and Valdés (1995) finding that large real appreciations are reversed by discrete
depreciations. Furthermore, given that the trade balance does not enter significantly, we believe
that these correlations do not speak to currency crises directly.
Finally, we ask if the 1990s are different from the 1980s. A number of specifications,
including a dummy and slope interaction terms to account for the possibility of a structural
change, are estimated. In column 7, the results for a representative specification are shown. The
key variables show up as significant, while the only statistically significant change is in the slope
coefficient for the US real interest rate. In words, this means that during the 1990s, crises are
more likely to occur for a given US real interest rate increase than was the case during the 1980s.
In Table 3, we report the results using CRISI2R, based on an exchange market pressure
variable. The results are largely in line with those in Table 2, with the following exceptions: the
lending boom variable is nowhere significant, and the capital flight variable is usually significant
19when it is included in a regression. Further note that in column 5, the reserves to M1 ratio is
completely uninformative about crises; moreover the R2 drops substantially. The only variable of
significance is capital flight. In column 6, we find that the role of real exchange rate
overvaluation is muted with this alternative definition of a currency crisis. The difference
between the 1980s and the 1990s shows up only in the slope coefficient associated with the US
real interest rate. In words, the estimates in column 7 indicate that real interest rates did not
matter in the 1980s, while they did in the 1990s.
In the regressions underlying the results in Tables 2 and 3, we have set a fairly high
standard —weseek to explain only the observations at the onset of a crisis, In most previous
analyses, the data analysed has been annual, so that the crisis is implicitly assumed to last a year.
If we adopt a similar perspective, defining the three subsequent quarters as crisis periods also, the
results in Table 4 are obtained. One notable finding is that the lending boom variable drops out of
significance (and is incorrectly signed). However, the reserves to domestic credit ratio and the
US real interest rate are always statistically significant; moreover, the inverse corruption and
capital flight variables are also statistically significant when the RS_DCR ratio is used. (If one
looks to the specification using the reserves to M1 ratio in column 5, one finds that
LTRANSPRNT96 and RUSareno longer significant at the conventional levels, although capital
flight is.)
Note that in column 6, the disequilibrium measures drop out of significance. In particular,
the real exchange rate deviation is completely irrelevant. Finally, accounting for a break at 1990,
one finds that the US real interest rate effect is coming almost wholely from the 1990s.
One link to the banking crisis literature is notable. Industrialized country real interest
rates appear to be key determinants of banking crises (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998; Hutchison
20and McDill, 1998). Interestingly, these authors also find that real overvaluation is not central to
the onset of a banking crisis.
4.3 Some Robustness Checks
In this subsection we check that our results are not being driven by either (i) the particular
selection of time periods and countries, (ii) the use of dichotomous dependent variables, or (iii)
the inappropriate imposition of coefficient restrictions.
The results in Tables 2-4 suggested that the 1990s were somewhat different from the
earlier period, especially in terms of the role for US real interest rates. Those results assumed the
same error variance in the 1980s as the 1990s. To relax this assumption, we stratified the sample,
and estimated the "Basic + Corruption & Flight" specification over only data for the 1990s. We
also estimated a specification augmented by the disequilibrium measures —theovervaluation
measure and the trade balance. These results are reported in Table 5, for the dependent variables
CRISI2R and CRISIS_P. The role of the reserves to domestic credit ratio is preserved in all
cases. The US real interest rate shows up as significant in all cases save one —usingCRISI2R as a
dependent variable and including the disequilibrium measures. The real overvaluation also shows
up as significant here. However, in explaining CRISIS_P, both US real interest rates and capital
flight are statistically significant determinants. Interestingly, LGBOOM is also significant
regardless of whether DEVJ and TB_Y are included (neither of these are statistically
significant).'5
Finally, it has been popular to argue that East Asia is governed by a different set of
economic laws than those that apply to the rest of the emerging markets. Econometrically, this
15Althoughthe standard overvaluation measure is not a robust indicator of crises, and alternative measure that
takes into account issues of real exchange rate nonstationarity (Chinn, 1998) does perform better across all
specifications.
21proposition reduces to assessing whether imposing common slope coefficients across Latin
America and East Asia is appropriate. Defining an ASIA dummy variable which takes on a value
of unity for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore and Thailand, we re-estimated the
specifications in Table 4 allowing for a mean shift, and slope interaction terms. The results (not
reported) do not indicate any robust slope differences. The mean shift coefficient is often
significant, but this probably reflects the 1990s (no East Asian country experiences a crisis in the
1980s). While in a specification including only RS DCR, LGBOOM and RUS,aninteraction term
on RS_DCR may show up as significant, this finding disappears when estimating the complete
equation ("Basic +Corruption+Flight").Finally, a Wald test for the restriction that all the slope
interaction terms are jointly zero fails to reject the null hypothesis.
5. Conclusions
We have argued that the predictions of the insurance model suggest a declining reserves
to bank liabilities ratio (holding asset quality constant) as the crisis approaches. Asset quality
may not be constant, and empirical evidence suggests that it deteriorates after a large burst in
domestic credit growth, as occurred in all these. Furthermore, the insurance model makes a
prediction regarding capital flight, validated by the data, not explicitly made in the other
theoretical frameworks. In the end, since we are interested in avoiding future crises, it would
seem prudent to subject the insurance model to further empirical testing.
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25TABLE 1
CAPITALFLOWS AND ASSETS FOR SELECTED EMERGING MARKETS
(Billionsof US $)
PrivateDebt Change in Reserves Rescue Package
lnf lows
19901996*1 989** 1990-1 996***
[1] [2] [3] [4]
China 217.2 44.9 77.5
Mexico112.5 95.6 15.2 47
Korea 79 33.1 19.2 52.8
Brazil 76 111.3 50.9
Malaysia 60.1 18.6 17.3
Indonesia 60.2 53.1 10.8 42.3
Thailand 47.8 23.5 24.4 17.2
Argentina 46.8 64.7 13.5
India 27.8 62.5 18.6
Russia59.9 79 5.4 22.6
Turkey23.2 41.6 10.4
Chile 20.2 18.2 8.8
Hungary 19.7 20.6 8.7
* Russia and Indonesia private inflows cover 1 990-1997.
** Russia's debt is from 1992.
Russia's change in reserves is measured from 1993-1 996; Mexico's change in reserves is
measured from 1990-1993.
Sources: Debt - World Debt Tables 1990 -1991,
Private Inflows - Global Development Finance, except Korea - International Financial
Statistics (IFS),
Change in Reserves - IFS,
Rescue Package - IMF
26Table 2
DETERMINANTS OF CRISES: 1980-97
Dependent variable: CRISISR, Dichotomous Measure of
of Depreciation
Basic Basic + Basic + Basic + Ml insteadBasic + Basic
CorruptionFlight Corruption of DomesticCorruption wI D90s
& Flight Credit & Flight &
Disequil' m
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RS_DCR ••• U•• I•U u•U•••
LGBOOM •[JLI] urn urn •EI]L] •uc:i •L]E]
RUS •E[I] •EIL] •EILIrn urn





















# Crises 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Notes: OLS regression results on panel with fixed country effects. Dependent variable is CRISISR takes on a value of unity
when the log differenced quarterly real exchange rate is less than -0.20 (see text). RS_DCR is the foreign exchange to
domestic credit ratio; LGBOOM is the 2 year change in the log real domestic credit; RUSisthe real US Fed Funds rate.
LTRANSPRNT96 is the log of the inverse corruption index in 1996, CFLT is capital flight to GDP ratio. RS_MRT is the
foreign exchange to Mi ratio; TBY is the trade balance to GDP ratio; DEVJ is the log-deviation of thereal exchange rate
from linear time trend; D9OS is a dummy variable for observations in the 1990's. McF R2 is the McFadden R2 statistic; N is the
number of observations; # Crises is the number observations where the dependent variable takes a value of unity. •EL
(RDLJ} (•UEI).uuidenotes significance at 20% {10%)(5%) [i%j marginal significance level in the anticipated
direction.
27Table 3
DETERMINANTS OF CRISES: 1980-97
Dependent variable: CRISI2R, Dichotomous Measure of
of Change in Exchange Market Pressure
Basic Basic + Basic + Basic + Ml insteadBasic + Basic
CorruptionFlight Corruption of DomesticCorruption wI D90s
& Flight Credit & Flight &
'
Disequilm
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RS_DCR ••• ••U •U• ••LI1••
LGBOOM DD DDD DDEI Drn rnn
RUS rn DE Drn mE Em
LTRANSPRNT96 Urn Em Drn Urn







.09 .11 .11 .07 .12 .12
N 621 621 522 522 522 507 621
#Crises 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Notes: OLS regression results on panel with fixed country effects. Dependent variable is CRISI2Rtakeson a value of unity
when the log differenced quarterly exchange market pressure variable is less than -0.20 (see text). RS_DCRisthe foreign
exchangeto domestic credit ratio; LGBOOM is the 2 year change in the log real domestic credit; RUS is the real US Fed Funds
rate. LTRANSPRNT96 is the log of the inverse corruption index in 1996, CFLT is capital flight to GDP ratio; RS_MRT is
the foreign exchange to Mi ratio; TB_Y is the trade balance to GDP ratio; DEVI is the log-deviation of the real exchange rate
from linear time trend; D9OS is a dummy variable for observations in the 1990's. McF R2 is the McFadden R2 statistic; N is the
number of observations; # Crises is the number observations where the dependent variable takes a value of unity. SLID
{•DEI}(U•El)[•••] denotessignificance at 20% (10%} (5%) 1%] marginal significance level in the anticipated
direction.
28Table 4
DETERMINANTS OF CRISES: 1980-97
Dependent variable: CRISIS_P, Dichotomous Measure of
of Change in Exchange Market Pressure
Basic Basic + Basic + Basic + Ml insteadBasic + Basic
CorruptionFlight Corruptionof DomesticCorruption w/ D90s
& Flight Credit & Flight &
Disequil'm
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RS_DCR ••U ••U•• UlU••
LGBOOM GEE OLE OLD DEE urn mu ODE
RUS UREl•• RUE •LILI URD mu
LTRANSPRNT96 ••• •UU EEL RUE RULII






MCF.R2 17 .19 .21 .22 .15 .22 .25
N 621 621 522 522 522 507 522
# Crises 74 74 74 74 75 74 74
Notes: OLS regression results on panel with fixed country effects. Dependent variable is CRISiS_P takes on a value of unity
when the log differenced quarterly exchange market pressure variable is less than -0.125, and for the subsequent three quarters
(see text). RS_DCR is the foreign exchange to domestic credit ratio; LGBOOM is the 2 year change in the log real domestic
credit; RUS is the real US Fed Funds rate. LTRANSPRNT96 is the log of the inverse corruption index in 1996, CFLT is capital
flight to GDP ratio. TB_Y is the trade balance to GDP ratio; RS_MRT is the foreign exchange to Mi ratio; DEVI is the log-
deviation of the real exchange rate from linear time trend; D9OS is a dummy variable for observations in the 1990's. McF R2 is
the McFadden R2 statistic; N is the number of observations; # Crises is the number observations where the dependent variable
takes a value of unity. •DLI {•ED} (UUD)[UUUIdenotes significance at 20% (lO%} (5%) [1%] marginal significance
level in the anticipated direction. ODE indicates significance level at the 20% marginal significance level in the unanticipated
direction.
29Table 5
DETERMINANTS OF CRISES: 1990-97
CRISI2R CRISIS_P
Basic + Basic + Basic + Basic +
Corruption Corruption CorruptionCorruption
& Flight & Flight & & Flight & Flight &
Disequil'm Disequil'm
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
RS_DCR UULI ••E ••••••
LGBOOM mu uDu •ILII u.n
RUS DDE ••U •U•
LTRANSPRNT96DEE nm om oun













# Crises 8 8 30 30
Notes: OLS regression results on panel with fixed country effects. Dependent variable is either CRISI2R or CRISiS_P (see
text for description). RS_DCR is the foreign exchange to domestic credit ratio; LGBOOM is the 2 year change in the log real
domestic credit; RUS is the real US Fed Funds rate. LTRANSPRNT96 is the log of the inverse corruption index in 1996, CFLT
is capital flight to GDP ratio. TB_Y is the trade balance to GDP ratio; DEVJ is the log-deviation of the real exchange rate
from linear time trend; D9OS is a dummy variable for observations in the 1990s. McF R2 is the McFadden R2 statistic; N is the
number of observations; # Crises is the number observations where the dependent variable takes a value of unity. •ELI
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Figure 2: Secondary Market Prices for Latin American
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Figure 3: Cumulative Inflows versus
Implied Insurance Pool. Source: Table 1 and
authors' calculations for Indonesia (IN),
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32Figure 4: Capital Flight to GDP Ratio, Latin








Figure5: Capital Flight to GDP Ratio,
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico
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Figure6: Capital Flight to GDP Ratio,
Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and
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Figure 7: Capital Flight to GDP Ratio,
Korea












Figure 8: Duration of Inflows versus Inverse of Corruption.
Regression line is for semilog specification.
Note: Duration is the number of quarter from the beginning of inflows or liberalization. Transparency
is an inverse measure of corruption. Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Hong Kong (HK), Indonesia (IN),
Korea (KO), Malaysia (MA), Mexico (MX), Philippines (PH), Taiwan (TI), Thailand (TH).
34
50
40
30
MA
0
KO P70
BR
MX
20
10.
6 8 10
Transparency